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THE HINES TRIAL-AMismIY
OF EVMECE OF PAST CRIM S.-
[New York] The recent indict-
ment under which James J. Hines
of New York City was brought to
trial contained one count of con-
spiring to commit certain felonies
all violating the penal laws of the
State of New York, and 12 counts
charging the commission of the sub-
stantive felonies or crimes of con-
triving, proposing and drawing a
lottery, or assisting in contriving,
proposing and drawing a lottery.
After the state had taken up four
weeks in the presentation of its
case against the defendant, and
during the cross-examination of
Lyon Boston, the first witness for
the defense, District Attorney
Thomas E. Dewey asked the ques-
tion which became the basis for a
motion for mistrial by defense
counsel, Lloyd Paul Stryker. The
motion was granted by Supreme
Court Justice Ferdinand Pecora.
(N. Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1938," p. 47,
col. 3.)
To better understand the con-
tentions pro and con concerning
this ruling, it is necessary to go
into the background of the witness
and the questions that were asked
of him on both direct and cross-
examination. Boston was a former
assistant district attorney under
William Copeland Dodge, and in
that capacity had conducted a pre-
vious investigation of the policy
racket. Almost all of this inves-
tigation was made before the
Grand Jury for March, 1935. (N.
Y. Times, Sept. 11, f938, p. 44, col.
5.) On direct examination Stry-
ker asked the witness the general
question-"Just tell the entire story
of that March grand jury. I think
it has been referred to quite gen-
erally as the runaway grand
jury." Boston replied that that
was *correct and Stryker continued,
'"Tell us your entire connection
with that, your entire association
with Mr. Wahl [another assistant
district attorney assisting in the
investigation], all that you recall
about that. Would that give you
an opportunity to tell me?" In
answer Boston testified that on the
instructions of Mr. Dodge he had
investigated Hines' connection with
the policy racket and also with the
slot machine racket and that he had
not found evidence sufficient to in-
dict him. He further testified, in
answer to a leading question by
Stryker, that the laymen on the
grand jury desired to indict Hines
on no legal evidence at all, and that
when he advised them such action
[590]
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was impossible under the law, a
controversy arose which eventu-
ally resulted in the grand jury's
request for discharge. Stryker's
reason for delving into this past
investigation was to build up the
defense of "persecution." By point-
ing out to the jury that Hines had
once been investigated for the same
crime and that no evidence had
been found against him, he was
drawing out the inference that the
defendant was a victim of Dewey's
ambition. On cross-examination
Dewey attempted to bring out that
there was other evidence before
that grand jury concerning Hines'
activities and that this other evi-
dence might have been a substantial
factor in the desire to indict him.
In the course of his examination
he asked the question, "Don't you
remember any testimony about
Hines and the poultry racket there
by Morgan?" It was at this point
that Stryker moved for a mistrial
on the ground that Dewey had
made an intentional prejudicial
statement, not predicated on any
evidence in the case, for the sole
purpose of prejudicing the defend-
ant on trial and as such it was
reversible error on appeal. (N. Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1938, p. 47, col. 3.)
In support of his question Dewey
contended first, that Stryker's gen-
eral question to the witness opened
the door for his inquiry into Hines'
connection with the poultry racket;
second, he had a right to ask the
question to impeach the credibility
of a witness; and third, that one
question could not prejudice the
defendant in the light of the 4600
pages of testimony that had been
given. (N. Y. Times, Sept. 12,
1938.) Stryker, on the other hand,
claimed that nothing'in the direct
examination opened the door for
Dewey's question; that his broad
question-and this in spite of the
fact that the witness on direct had
linked Hines with the slot machine
racket--dealt entirely with the
policy racket; and, although there
is nothing in the report of the case
to show this, that the court had
warned Dewey to confine himself
to the policy racket. (N. Y. Times,
Sept. 1"2, 1938.)
It cannot be conceived that
Dewey asked the question merely
to show the bad character of Hines.
There are too many other points
upon which it might be considered
relevant. He was completing a
story which the defense on direct
had left unfinished. He was im-
peaching the credibility of a wit-
ness. He was attempting to bring
out that Dodge, then district attor-
ney, was protecting Hines before
the grand jury. This, he maintains,
was a vital issue of the trial, and
therefore a proper concern of the
prosecution in his cross-examina-
tion of the witness who was in a
positionto know what occurred be-
fore the grand jury. It is apparent
that Dewey was referring to the
testimony relating to the contro-
versy between the district attor-
ney's office and the grand jury,
which resulted in the grand jury's
request for discharge. The defense
claimed there was insufficient evi-
dence to indict Hines and that the
grand jury requested its discharge
because the district attorney re-
fused to indict on such evidence.
Dewey claimed there was sufficient
evidence to indict Hines, but that
the grand jury was driven to its
request by the district attorney's
refusal to co-operate with them.
While relevant for any of these
purposes the question is inadmis-
sible for any of them on the basis
of the decision in People v. Mol-
ineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286
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(1901). That rule is substantially
followed by the courts of New
York and says, in effect, that on a
criminal trial the state cannot
prove any crime against the de-
fendant not alleged in the indict-
ment as aiding proof that he is
guilty of the crime charged unless
such other crime tends to prove
motive, intent, absence of mistake
or accident, identity of the person
charged, or a common scheme or
plan embracing the commission of
two or more crimes so closely re-
lated that proof of one tends to es-
tablish the other. Seemingly
Dewey was attempting to show that
Hines, by virtue of his political
position, had a scheme or plan to
exact tribute from all the rackets
of New York City. The question
was not only relevant but admis-
sible under this rule.
Stryker, in going into the inves-
tigation of Hines before that March
grand jury was showing that the
witness had made a fair, thor-
ough, unfettered investigation and
that Hines' hands were clean. An
inference can be drawn from the
questions on direct that Stryker
was going even beyond this, that
without the use of direct questions
he was trying to prove Hines' good
character by this witness. If such
was the case, and Bostpn was actu-
ally a character witness for the de-
fense, Dewey would have been
justified in asking him concerning
past criminal acts of the defendant.
People v. Jeffery, 31 N. Y. 267
(1894); People v. Callahan, 10 N.
Y. 1041 (1911).
In his opinion Justice Pecora re-
fuses to consider Dewey's conten-
tions and assumes that the question
was prejudicial. Comparing the
question to "one drop of poison"
in the human blood stream he cites
numerous cases to support him.
These cases can be readily distin-
guished from the present one. The
two cases upon which he places the
most reliance are People v. Robin-
son, 273 N. Y. 438, 8 N. E. (2d) 25
(1937) and People v. Posner, 273
N. Y. 184, 7 N. E. (2d) 93 (1937).
In the former the decision of the
trial court was reversed not on the
unanswered questions of the dis-
trict attorney, but on the prejudi-
cial answer of the witness. In the
latter the district attorney insinu-
ated by questions to which answers
were received that the defendant
had been guilty of improper con-
duct. By these questions, which
did not allow the telling of a com-
plete story, the district attorney
built up a case against the defend-
ant, and it was on the basis of the
series of questions and all the an-
swers that the trial court was re-
versed. In the other cases cited by
the Justice like situations are
found, either the question climaxed
a series of insinuations by the dis-
trict attorney, or the witness was
allowed to answer. In the present
case neither did the witness an-
swer nor was there a series of in-
sinuations on the part of Dewey.
Where a single improper question
has been asked and not answered
the great weight of authority sup-
ports the proposition that it is not
reversible error. U. S. v. Frankel
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1933), 65 F. (2d)
285; State v. Kwan, 25 P. (2d) 104,
174 Wash. 528 (1933); People v.
Gray, 218 P. 49, 63 Cal. App. 59
(1923). The New York court has
laid down an even broader rule in
People v. Pacelli, 251 N. Y. 66, 167
N. E. 173 (1929). In that case the
defendant was on trial for keeping
a disorderly house. A witness tes-
tified the defendant had admitted
to him and to the district attor-
ney that she had been previously
RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
convicted on the same charge. The
district attorney in summation
twice referred to the admission.
The trial judge instructed the jury
to disregard the admission. The
Court of Appeals held that an ad-
monition to the jury by the trial
judge to disregard the admission
as no evidence in the case would
cure the harm and it would not be
held reversible error.
On the basis of the peculiarities
of this situation it seems clear to
us that Justice Pecora abused his
discretion in granting a new trial.
By refusing to rule on the motion
at the time it was made and re-
serving his opinion until a later
day he placed himself in a more
difficult position than was neces-
sary, for he gave the jury time to
impress the question firmly on its
mind. In spite of this it is ex-
tremely doubtful if this is "one
drop of poison," at least a strong
enough drop to do the damage
claimed. Not only were there 4600
pages of testimony on the state's
side of the case, but the defense
itself had connected Hines with
still another crime, the slot ma-
chine racket. In view of this the
question seems completely harm-
less. If Hines was innocent he had
nothing to fear from that one ques-
tion, and he had a right to have
that innocence declared by the
jury. If they found him guilty he
still had his right of appeal to cor-
rect the error, if error it was.
The trial had been in progress
for four weeks. The Justice was
ever alert to protect the defendant
at all times. It is difficult, even
impossible, for a prosecutor to con-
duct a trial for that long a time
without error, and if he did make
a slip there was this jury to con-
sider. It had been impanelled un-
der the laws of *New York which
make available for jury service
persons of the highest type. N. Y.
Stat. (Baldwin, 1938), Jud. Law,
arts. 16, 17, 18, 18b. It, above all
other juries, should have been ex-
pected to weigh the evidence for
what it was worth. Noted far and
wide as the "blue ribbon jury" it
was composed of men from the
upper walks of life whose intelli-
gence was high, whose education
was far above average; yet this as-
pect of the case did not seem to
occur to Justice Pecora.
In the light of all the circum-
stances it is apparent that Justice
Pecora, should have ruled other-
wise. A great deal of money and
time had been spent on behalf 6f
both the state and the defense.
.Had he ruled otherwise he would
have been supported not only by
the law, but by common sense, and
justice would have been done not
only the people of New York, but




fendant David Rosen was con-
victed of robbery for having forc-
ibly retaken $198 from one Whit-
comb, keeper of the funds in a
gambling house where defendant
had lost the sum retaken. On ap-
peal the California Supreme Court
reversed the conviction. People v.
Rosen, 78 P. (2d) 727 (Cal., 1938).
Thus is poised the question of
whether it is robbery for a person
to forcibly retake from another
money he has lost at gambling.
Although it is not clear whether
Whitcomb was the proprietor of
Miller's Tango Parlor, at least he
was an agent in charge of win-
nings and therefore may, for the
purposes of our inquiry, be con-
sidered as standing in the same
position as the winner. Further-
more it is of no import that Whit-
comb may not have actually owned
the money, for one having a right
of possession against a wrongdoer
is, so far as the latter is concerned,
the "owner." Ex parte Duel, 11:2
Cal. App. 24, 296 Pac. 91 (1931)
citing People v. Edwards, 72 Cal.
App. 102, 236 Pac. 944 (1925).
Robbery as defined in the Cali-
fornia Penal Code, §211, compar-
able to the common law and to the
statutes of other jurisdictions, is
"the felonious taking of personal
property in the possession of an-
other, from his person or immedi-
ate presence, and against his will,
accomplished by means of force or
fear."
In the instant case the only con-
troversial issue is that of felonious
intent or animus furandi-viz., in-
tent to appropriate the money.
Johnson v. State, 24 Okla. Cr. Rep.
326, 218 Pac. 179 (1923).
It is well settled that one cannot
be guilty of robbery by taking from
the possession of another his owr
specific property or property which
he bona fide believes to be his
own. This is true even though the
taking is accomplished under cir-
cumstances which would amount
to robbery if the property belonged
to the person from whom taken.
54 C. J. 1028; 23 R. C. L. 1142;
Brown v. State, 28 Ark. 126 (1873);
Crawford v. State, 90 Ga. 701, 17 S.
EK 628 (1893); Triplett v. Com., 122
Ky. 35, 91 S. W. 281 (1906); People
v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 Pac. 492
(1895); State v. Steele, 150 Wash.
466, 273 Pac. 742 (1929); Butts v.
Com., 145 Va. 800, 133 S. E. 764,
768 (1926). The reason for this
rule is that in such cases there
cannot exist the requirement of an
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intent to steal. People v. Sheasbey,
supra.
Therefore the question resolves
into the credibility of the defend-
ant-witness, and it is a question
for the jury whether a particular
defendant had such a bona fide be-
lief. Johnson v. State, 24 Okla. Cr.
Rep. 326, 2M8 Pac. 179 (1923). Ac-
cordingly the decision reached in
the instant case appears sound since
no prejudicial instruction was given
the jury upon that point.
Looking more broadly at the
question, however, the main issue
is whether or not title has passed
to the winner of a gambling game
when the monev has been handed
over voluntarily by the loser. In
their .treatment of this point the
various jurisdictions are not in ac-
cord. Some courts maintain that
it is untrue that one may acquire
a valid title to money by the
simple, but unlawful, process of
gambling. Thompson v. Com. 13
S. W..1022 (Ky., 1892); People v.
Henry, 202 Mich. 450, 168 N. W.
534 (1918); State v. Price, 38 Idaho
]M9, 219 Pac. 1049 (1923); Sikes v.
Com., 34 S. -W. 902 (Ky., 1896).
Texas, on the contrary, holds that
voluntary delivery of possession of
the money to the winner vests title
in him so that the forcible taking
thereof may be considered robbery.
Coker v. State, 71 Tex. Crim. Rep.
504, 160 S. W. 366 (1913); Carroll
v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 30, 57
S. W. 99 (1900).
The latter view is supported by
the judicial theory of in par! delicto
wherein both parties being equally
guilty are looked upon in the same
light and the winner becomes the
owner when the money has been
peacefully paid over. Blain v.
State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 448, 3f S.
W. 368 (1895).
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It has been suggested that one
basis of distinction anent the issue
of passage of title is the existence
of statutory provisions giving the
loser a civil right to recover the
money lost. 35 A. L. R. 1461, 1462.
In Texas where there is no such
statute, the decisions hold, in cases
with fact situations similar to that
of the instant problem, that title
passes to the winner and that rob-
bery has been committed. Coker
v. State, supra; Carroll v. State,
supra. In Kentucky and Michigan,
where there are recovery statutes,
title has been held to remain in
the loser, and consequently no rob-
bery has been committed. People
v. Henry, supra; Thompson v. Com-
monwealth, supra.
However, in Idaho and Georgia,
where there are no recovery stat-
utes the courts have held that no
title has passed and that a convic-
tion for robbery must fail. State
v. Price, supra; Grant v. State, 115
Ga. 205, 41 S. E. 698 (1902).
The latter jurisdictions indicate
that the existence of recovery stat-
utes is immaterial to the resolution
of the question, and there being a
split in the authorities as to whether
or not title has passed enabling a
robbery conviction to be upheld,
the only forecast for the future can
be based on public policy. The
verdict in the instant case seems
proper for a number of reasons:
1-robbery is a serious felony for
which a person should not be con-
victed and cannot be convicted
without proof of a felonious intent;
2-it is arguable whether title to
the winnings passes to the victor
or not; 3-although ignorance of
the law is no excuse, a bona fide
belief that the defendant is entitled
to the money prevents him from
possessing animus furandi; 4-
there can be a conviction on other
grounds: assault with a deadly
weapon, aggravated assault, etc.,
and the guilty party will not be




tion was known to exist as far back
as the early Greeks is evidenced
by its prohibition in the Oath of
Hippocrates taken by healers. The
religious and economic tendencies
of that time favored an increasing
population and were responsible
for its prohibition. Many of the
early writers were of the opinion,
however, that abortion might be
excusable or even commendable in
* a community faced with an in-
crease in population without a
proportional means of subsistence
-the Malthusian theory. In Eng-
land in medieval times the inroads
of the Black Death, the Hundred
Years War, and the War of the
Roses made an increased birthrate
necessary, thus furnishing the rea-
son for the abortion law in the 14th
century. Minty, Medical Quack-
ery (1932) 142. At that time the
church was very powerful and had
a code of laws separate from the
common law. If abortion had been
regarded as a religious problem, it
would have been prohibited in the
church's code rather than left to
the common law, thus it follows
that abortion was not contrary to
early religious principles.
Abortion is made a felony by
statute in every state in the Union.
A typical example is that of Illi-
nois, Ill. State Bar Stat. (1937) c.
38, §3, which provides that any
person who performs an abortion
when it is not necessary to save
the mother's life, shall be sen-
tenced from 1-10 years. If the
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mother dies, such person shall be
prosecuted for rpurder.
The necessity of safeguarding the
morals of unmarried people, ill-
effect on the woman's health, dan-
ger to the safety of the state in-
volved in unnatural limitation of
growth of population, and religious
pressure are the most common rea-
sons advanced for passing abor-
tion statutes. These statutes seem
never to have been properly en-
forced. Alabama has had only 40
prosecutions and of that number
only 5 convictions between 1892-
1935; Cook County has had only
39 prosecutions and of that num-
ber only 9 convictions between
1925235. (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev.
87, 91, n. 18. On the other hand
we find the practice to be preva-
lent. The number of abortions in
Chicago alone is from 8,000-10,000
annually, while the total figure for
the entire country is about 680,000
annually. Kopp, Birth Control in
Practice (1934) 1M1-27. However,
it is almost impossible to get ac-
curate statistics on the subject be-
cause it is so easily concealed un-
der existing conditions. "The fre-
quency of arrests or trials for
abortion afford no criterion of the
actual frequency of the crime.
Laws on abortion are so easily
evaded that officers of justice find
it useless to trouble themselves
with prosecution . . . ." Storer,
Criminal Abortion 136 (1868). The
paucity of prosecutions are attri-
butable to the reluctance of the
legal profession to prosecute the
medical profession, the difficulty of
obtaining a prosecuting witness be-
cause of the unfavorable publicity
accompanying prosecution, and the
difficulty of detection because of
the secrecy of the operation.
The only exception to criminal
responsibility for abortion under
the statutes is necessity in fact for
the preservation of the mother's
life-therapeutic abortion. As to
what constitutes necessity is a jury
question to be determined in the
particular case. Commonwealth v.
Hoyt, 279 Masa. 400, 181 N. E. 473
(1932); Commonwealth v. Polian,
288 Mass. 494, 193 N. E. 68 (1934)
Some state courts give a strict con-
struction of the statutory exception
restricting it to the preservation of
life only. State v. Rudman, 126 Me.
177, 136 Atl. 817 (1927); Roder-
mund v. State, 167 Wis. 577, 168 N.
W. 390 (1918); State v. Powers, 155
Wash. 63, 283 Pac. 439 (1929). A
few States are more liberal allow-
ing a physician to perform an abor-
tion when peril to life is not neces-
sarily imminent, but where health
would be impaired. State v.
Dunlcelbarger, 206 Iowa 98, 221 N.
W. 592 (1928). This is a minority
view, however, in this country,
most American courts not giving
doctors discretionary power to op-
erate under the statute. State v.
Tippie, 89 Oh. St. 35, 105 N. E. 75,
77 (1913). The motive of the doc-
tor is immaterial and only a few
states recognize good faith as a de-
fense. "Motive is more or less im-
material in abortion. The gist of
the crime is in the intent to pro-
cure a miscarriage. If the act is
done with this intent without a
lawful justification, the crime is
complete regardless of motive." 1
C. J. Sec. 312. Also State v. Rud-
man, supra; Hatchard v. State, 79
Wis. 357, 48 N. W. 380 (1891).
The situation has been almost
identical in England where, as in
America, abortion is made a felony
unless performed to save the
mother's life. Recently, however,
a prominent English obstetrician
performed an abortion on a 15 year
old girl to preserve her mental and
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physical health, and was prose-
cuted under the English Preserva-
tion of Life Statute. The girl had
been criminally attacked and preg-
nancy resulted. The physical in-
juries would not have caused diffi-
culty in delivery, but the circum-
stances were such that a mental
breakdown seemed likely if preg-
nancy was not terminated. See
(1938) Journal of the American
Medical Association, Vol IH, No.
8, 731. The defendant contended
that the statute should be liberally
construed allowing doctors wide
latitude to terminate pregnancy
when mental and physical health
were impaired, and there should
be no dividing line between dan-
ger to life and danger to health.
Justice MacNaughten in summing
up said, "If pregnancy is likely to
make a woman a physical wreck"
a doctor who operated in that be-
lief did so "for the purpose of pre-
serving the mother's life." He fur-
ther stated that the defendant had
performed "an act of charity with-
out fee." The defendant was ac-
quitted. N. Y. Times, July 20,
1938, page 4, col. 2.
This is clearly an advance over
American decisions. The interpre-
tation of the American statutes is
unsatisfactory for several reasons.
First, the abortion statutes have
resulted in abortions being per-
formed by quacks, midwives and
incompetent doctors, because rep-
utable physicians are afraid of
prosecution and blackmail if- they
perform an abortion. Secondly,
even if the doctor or midwife is
skilled they must operate with a
secrecy which prevents the subse-
quent attention necessary for the
safest performance of the opera-
tion. One of the greatest dangers
in procuring an abortion is the pos-
sibility of infection arising from its
unsanitary performance. Most of
the deaths arising from this opera-
tion are due to infection. Kopp,
supra, estimates about 680,000
abortions are performed annually
in the United States and about
8,000 deaths from termination of
pr6gnancy or about one death for
every 75 abortions performedl
whereas in Russia where abortion
is legalized and under government
supervision there is only 1 death
per every 20,000 abortions per-
formed. Thirdly, it has not raised
the moral standard of unmarried
people but rather has been avoided
by the use of contraceptives.
Further, most abortions are per-
formed upon married women who
submit to the operation because
'more children would injure their
future health and because they are
financially unable to support any
more children. (1935) 35 Col. L.
Rev. 87, 93, n. 39. Finally abortion"
statutes have not resulted in an in-
creased birth-rate because they
have not decreased the actual num-
ber of abortions.
Giving a more liberal interpreta-
tion to our existing statutes as in
the English case is not an effective
solution, since the shadow of crim-
inality would still be cast over doc-
tors terminating pregnancy and
would discourage them -from per-
forming the operation in justifiable
cases. Seemingly the solution lies
in the hands of the legislature. A
law should be passed and strictly
enforced making it a criminal of
fense for anyone but a licensed
physician to perform an abortion.
While the number of prosecutions
under the statutes at present, are
few making it a seemingly unim-
portant law, its effects are in real-
ity far-reaching in that it is indi-
rectly responsible for the high
death rate in abortion operations.
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Legalized abortion would eliminate
this evil. One of the leading argu-
ments against legalized abortion is
that it would greatly decrease the
birth rate. True, there would be
an increase in the number of abor-
tions among poorer classes of peo-
ple but this would seem to be more
.of a good than an evil. The total
number of abortions for all classes
would not increase to such an ex-
tent as to seriously decrease the
present birth rate because physi-
cians would only act in justifiable
cases. Further, normal married
people do not want to avoid child-
birth unless they absolufely have
to.
The advantages of legalized abor-
tion would be manifold. It would
enable the dissemination of accur-
ate statistical information. More-
over, protection of the social, phys-
ical, and mental future of innocent
girls who have been criminally at-
tacked would be afforded. Like-
wise it would make for better fu-
ture generations by providing a
means of eliminating the birth of
children to physical and mental de-
fectives. Minty, supra, 151 writes,
"Many mentally defective children
are born of mentally defective par-
ents. It is almost certain that men-
tally defective women will breed
mentally defective children. Those
who allow such children to be born
are guilty of a grave moral crime,
for such a child is condemned to
inescapable misery and degrada-
tion . . . ." Finally, it would
eliminate the extortionate prices
now charged by quacks and mid-
wives who are able to charge high
prices because of the risk they take
rather than for the skill that is
required to perform it properly.
Reputable doctors would perform
the operation at a nominal charge
and under sanitary conditions when
in their discretion as a physician
it is physically, socially, and eco-
nomically desirable.
JACK FROST.
LOTTERY-WHAT IS A LoTTRY-
As UNFAIR TRADE.-[Illinois] To
promote advertising a distributor
of gas and oil products gave quali-
fying cards not only to purchasers
of his products but also to any auto
owner or driver requesting them. At
the end of each month the holder of
such a card was entitled to partici-
pate in a cash drawing of $200. A
competing gas and oil merchant just
across the street sought to enjoin
the defendant, claiming the plan
was a lottery. Held: temporary
injunction affirmed on appeal.
Jones v. Smith Oil & Refining Co.,
15 N. E. (2nd) 42 (1'938). The
court found the three elements of
a lottery-prize, chance, and con-
sideration-constituted a plan vio-
lating the law and unfair to plain-
tiff's business.
In England as early as 1541 an
act prohibited lotteries because the
young men spent their time gam-
bling instead of practicing archery.
Later in 1698 another act forbade
lotteries because they were inim-
ical to good trade, welfare, and
peace. 173 L. T. 237 (1932). Then
in 1823 the English Parliament pro-
hibited all lotteries except those
authorized by Parliament. Lotter-
ies Act, 4 Geo. 4, c. 60 (1823). This
includes horse racing subscriptions.
Allport v. Nutt, 14 L. J. 272 (1845).
Finally in 1934 the Betting and
Lotteries Act prohibited all lotter-
ies except small ones incidental to
entertainments and private lotter-
ies; the Act further permitted lot-
tery tickets to be sent through the
mails. See 78 L. J. 433 (1934).
This relaxation in the attitude
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toward lotteries may be an effect
of the Irish Hospitals Sweepstakes,
a charity enterprise, which finds a
huge market for its tickets in Eng-
land. Journal of Comp. Legis. and
International Law, Vol. 14, p. 286
(3rd series, 1932).
Though England has relaxed its
lottery law somewhat, many of the
states in this country still have
laws forbidding lotteries. See 2
Wharton, Criminal Law, §§1777,
1778 (12th ed., 1932) and cases
cited. In further tightening the
state restrictions, Congress has
closed the mails and interstate com-
merce against lottery tickets. The
Lpttery Case, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
The disfavor in the United States
against lotteries is founded in the
protection of those who would dis-
sipate their money by gambling
against odds not fully appreciated.
See 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1205 (1931).
Further evils of lotteries include
enhancement of a desire to get
something not earned, the encour-
agement of the gambling instinct,
and the destruction of individual
initiative essential to individual
livelihood and citizenship. State
ex rel. Hunter v. Fox Beatrice
Theatre Corp., 133 Neb. 392, 275 N.
W. 605 (1937).
The usual concept of a lottery
attaches to a scheme for the dis-
tribution of prizes by chance
among persois purchaihAg tickets.
2 Wharton, op. cit., p. 2075, §1778.
Not having an exact legal defini-
tion the word lottery may be con-
strued in this commonly accepted
meaning. U. S. v. Olney, Fed. Cas.
No. 15, 1918 (1868). Difficulty of
interpretation hinges not so much
on prize and chance as on the ele-
ment of consideration. The idea
that the consideration is the price
paid by the purchaser for the
chance to get a prize is fundamen-
tal. Cf. Williston on Contracts §100
(1926). Variations of this idea
make for difficulty in the lottery
question.
Where lottery tickets are bought
outright for a chance to win a prize,
the consideration is plain in that
moniey has been paid for the ticket
alone. Where chances are bought
with purchases, even though at no
increased cost, of entertainment or
merchandise, there is a lottery on
the ground that the price furnishes
the consideration for both. State
V. Powell, 170 Minn. 239, 212 N. W.
169 (1927). But see R. J. Williams
Furniture Co. v. McComb Chamber
of Commerce, 147 Miss. 649, 112 So.
579 (1927). Where 'chances ate
offered to purchasers and non-pur-
chasers alike, the courts are hope-
lessly divided. Some may find
consideration, as in the theater
cases, in increased attendance and
the fact that free ticket distribu-
tion was negligible. State v. Danz,
140 Wash. 349, 250 Pac. 37 (1926).
In a case similar to the instant case
the court penetrated through the
free distribution plan and held that
the price paid constituted the ag-
gregate price for the merchandise
and the chance. Featherstone v.
Independent Service Station Ass'n,
10 S. W. (2nd) 124 (Tex., Civ.
App., 1928). Other courts say
there ,is no lottery where a con-
testant may obtain a chance with-
oi4 laying for entei-tainment or
merchandise. Cross v. People, 18
Colo. 321, 32 Pac. 821 (1893); Peo-
ple v. Mail Express Co., 179 N. Y.
S. 640 (1919); State v. Hundling,
220 Iowa 1369, 264 N. W. 608 (1936).
But see Maughs v. Porter, 157 Va.
415, i61 S. E. 242 (1931) where
consideration for a lottery was
found in mere attendance at an
auction sale. This interpretation of
consideration has been criticized.
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80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 744 (1932); 18
Va. L. Rev 465 (1932). However,
though pecuniary consideration
may not be found for a lottery to
convict in a criminal prosecution,
there may be enough consideration
to support a suit by the winner for
collection of the prize. Corio v.
Laurelton Amusement Co., N. Y.
L. J., p. 764, col. 2 (Feb. 13, 1937,
Sup. Ct. App. term). That is, the
contract was not affected by the
lottery laws because the ticket
holder had not paid monetary con-
sideration. Such an approach lends
support to a belief that courts
might construe a different con-
sideration in a civil suit than in a
lottery prosecution. See 37 Col.
L Rev. 877 (1937).
In some instances courts may also
look to see whether the plan in
question is an evasion of the stat-
ute or an avoidance of the statute,
the latter being permitted. State v.
Eames, 87 N. H. 477, 183 AtL 590
(1936). Thus there was an eva-
sion where the plan was changed
from one giving tickets only to
customers to one giving tickets both
to customers and non-customers.
Featherstone v. Independent Serv-
ice Ass'n, supra. In the instant
case which relies heavily on the
Featherstone case, there was no
such evasion.
The court relied also on a bank
night case, Iris Amusement Co. v.
Kelly, 366 Ill. 256, 8 N. E. (2nd)
648 (1937) which found considera-
tion for an increased chance to win
in the price of admission. In ap-
plying this case to the instant sit-
uation the court apparently over-
looked the distinguishing fact that
non-purchasers had an equal
chance with purchasers in the gas
and oil scheme because all were
privileged to attend the drawing.
In interpreting consideration for
the non-purchasers the court said
that the money paid in by those
who purchased gas and oil and re-
ceived tickets furnished the con-
sideration for non-purchasers. If
the participation of non-purchasers
was negligible, such a test of con-
sideration might be valid. But as
the amount of non-purchaser par-
ticipation increases (and the court
does not say here that non-pur-
chaser participation was negligible)
the proposed test of consideration
seems inadequate. Indeed by this
test if 5% of participants were pur-
chasers and 95% were not, then the
court would be placed in an anom-
alous position by declaring con-
sideration from purchasers fur-
nished consideration for the lot-
tery when in reality the monetary
consideration was negligible. Fail-
ing to stress the fact of participa-
tion, the court lays down a formula
which might well work an injus-
tice in a case where free partici-
pation is a reality.
The original aversion to lotteries,
based on the protection of those
who might lose their money in an
effort to get something for noth-
ing, thus has been expanded to
protect by injunction a merchant's
advertising scheme in which no one
loses any money--except the pro-
tected merchant whose business
decreased. Declaring a lottery did
not protect anyone from dissipating
his money. Insofar as lottery laws
may be designed for other pur-
poses the court might well have
examined the fact of non-purchaser
participation to supplement its the-
ory of consideration, particularly if
such participation was negligible.
The court in effect disregarded the
non-purchasers in its effort to de-
clare a lottery, that is, it did not
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look into the extent of their ac-
tivity in the plan. Much more in-
tellectually satisfactory would it
have been if the court had openly
declared that monetary considera-
tion was not required for a lottery
or that the plan was illegal because
it made the disposal of property de-
pendent upon a chance by lot. See
Smith-Hurd, IlL, StAt. c. 38, §406
(1937).
0. WENDELL LANNING.
